Powering defense: The strategic metals shaping warfare | Fast Forward Market Briefing transcript  

Andrea Hotter [AH]: Welcome back to Fast Forward. This is the Market Briefing podcast, and today we are discussing four relatively obscure, but strategically vital materials: cobalt, gallium, germanium, and antimony.

These elements sit at the intersection of defense technology, global supply chains and geopolitical competition, and so joining me to talk about them today is Jon Stibbs, Fastmarkets Europe technology and energy metals editor.

Jon, thank you for being here.

Jon Stibbs [JS]: Oh, thank you for having me, Andrea. Lovely to see you.

[AH]: Great. Well, I think it would be very helpful to start by understanding why these materials matter. So maybe you could just tell us why are cobalt, gallium, germanium, and antimony. so important to modern defense systems?

[JS]: Well, the four of them, among their so-called exotic metals, are considered critical to defense systems because they enable performance that’s hard to achieve with more commonplace materials, especially under high heat or high power, or some sort of contested electromagnetic environments.

So, if we wanna start with cobalt.

It underpins the super alloys used in jet engines and heat resistant components, and used in certain high performance magnets and rechargeable batteries that power portable and unmanned platforms.

Gallium, notably in gallium nitrate, is essential to advanced radio frequency electronics, boosting radar, electronic warfare, and secure communications with higher power, density and efficiency.

Germanium meanwhile, is widely used in infrared optics and imaging, including some night vision and targeting systems, as well as specialized semiconductors for high-speed or space applications.

And last we have antimony, which hardens lead alloys, which is used in ammunition, as well as improving battery performance and providing some flame retardant compounds.

So put together. All four are strategically important ’cause their supply chains are concentrated and substitution opportunities are, are really very limited.

[AH]: Fascinating. So I think you’ve just established that these are pretty foundational inputs for the military as well, because without them, a lot of advanced defense capability simply doesn’t materialize.

It would be really great to have some perhaps concrete examples of how these show up in military hardware or applications.

[JS]: Yeah, sure. So if you want to kick off with cobalt in a bit more detail about how those cobalt based super alloys are used, so as I say, they’re in the military jet engines such as turbine blades or the veins and combustor components.

Also, cobalt is key in some of the sumerian cobalt permanent magnets, which are found in high-temperature motor or actuator assemblies, as well as certain guidance and sensing hardware. And cobalt also appears in lithium-ion batteries, which powers the radios, as well as those soldier systems that are made up of an integrated set of equipment and technologies that are designed to enhance a soldier’s performance.

Gallium meanwhile shows up in gallium nitride and arsenide chips, which are used in AESA, which is electronically scanned array radars. These are made up of hundreds or even thousands of modules. As well as electronic warfare jammers, satellite communications terminals, and other high frequency transmit and receive modules.

Meanwhile, germanium is used in lenses and windows for infrared cameras on night vision devices, targeting pod sensor systems carried by military aircraft, as well as seeker heads, fitter missiles and sensors used for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

And lastly, antimony appears in flame-retardant plastics and cable jackets inside vehicles, ships and shelters, and in lead antimony alloys for some ammunition.

Also, it has a role in robust lead acid batteries used for starting backup power and ground equipment that needs to stand up to really demanding conditions.

[AH]: Wow. I mean, I’m not gonna pretend to understand the technology behind any of those uses, but it definitely highlights how integrated they are across all of these systems, not just in the niche components.

So now we understand the importance. It’d be really interesting to talk about the supply chain side. So where do these materials come from and. Why are we starting to get a little bit worried about that right now?

[JS]: So these materials are strategically awkward for Western bodies because their mining and especially processing are highly concentrated in a small number of countries that aren’t necessarily allies.

So cobalt is mine mainly as a byproduct of copper and nickel, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo dominates mine supply with around 70% of the supply over the recent years. And meanwhile, refining is heavily concentrated in China. Gallium is recovered as a byproduct of aluminium and zinc processing. And again, it’s China that overwhelmingly dominates the refined output.

And this leaves just a few scalable alternatives available for western’s defense consumers. Meanwhile, similar story with germanium, a byproduct this time of zinc processing, and here it’s China that’s again, the leading producer and refiner. And this leaves the market vulnerable again as controls to being imposed as perhaps we can talk about later on.

Antimony is also China, where the mining is strongest, but there’s also production elsewhere in Tajikistan and Türkiye, with smaller volumes from countries such as Myanmar and Bolivia. Again, processing capacity is also highly concentrated, so if you put this picture together, you’ve got a real problem for Western defense suppliers.

Disruption can come from various sources. A single policy decision, also byproduct supplies can change, which can affect the amount of material that comes onto the market. Meanwhile, reshoring is also difficult because new projects and specialized refining can take years to go through the process of permitting, finance and qualification.

So it’s a difficult situation.

[AH]: It certainly sounds like it. A lot of strategic risks there, whether it’s from political, economic or military. Sounds like it can really directly impact defense readiness as well, and that concentration point is striking as well. It’s interesting you talked there about restrictions.

Now we have seen export restrictions emerge in recent years, so how is that affecting defense planning?

[JS]: Well, in short, it just makes life very difficult for the primes. The primes are what are known as the prime contractors, are holding the main contracts with a government or military customer, so they can’t be sure where their source of material is gonna be secure in arriving.

So export restrictions and controls on cobalt, gallium germanian, antimony have all cropped up recently for different reasons. Back in 23, China imposed export licensing requirements on gallium and germanium metal, and that even from then halted all exports to the US.

In theory, they read even tighter with a whole ban that was imposed the December of the following year. But actually there was no material already moving even along before then.

This set prices outside of China soaring and has underscored Beijing’s ability to leverage its dominance in these niche, but strategic defense materials. Antimony has also been subject to tighter export controls. China has ratcheted up export controls there since August of 24.

This has culminated in a defacto ban of exports to the US. It’s been a different situation for cobalt. Rather than being swept up in geopolitical power plays. The Democratic of Congo, the biggest producer of the raw material, has tightened supply through an export ban. There’s now a quota system in place in an attempt to ramp up prices.

So, in each of their own individual ways, there’s been these limits in supply that have really affected how the downstream market has had to operate.

[AH]: Yeah, fascinating. And I’m sure we could probably go into each of those and take an entire podcast discussing the whats and whens and so on, but I know we don’t have time now.

I think the most important thing is you’ve just noticed though, it really effectively turns these materials into policy tools, not just commodities. So that’s a fascinating development. With all that said, how is Europe responding to these supply chain vulnerabilities and reacting?

[JS]: Well, Europe is certainly seeking to secure its own supplies of all these materials, cobalt, gallium, germanium, antimony for its defense purposes.

And it is aligning its critical minerals policy to bring it closer in tune with what’s required for strategic and military needs. So the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act has elevated all these metals into strategic inputs for defense and semiconductors and advanced electronics. So there are targets in place to expand domestic extraction, processing, recycling and reduce that reliance on single suppliers.

This has been ramped up a bit further with the EU’s resource EU Action Plan, which was launched last December. However, cobalt’s the only one of those minerals that is explicitly mentioned in the document where it’s seen as a battery material.

So Europe does have projects to support its domestic and regional production where feasible, but there are obviously limitations on what it can do domestically, and there are projects to encourage mining, processing and recycling.

The EU’s funding tools are being used to de-risk as well, and externally, the EU is also building up strategic partnerships and offtake agreements with allied resource holders, such as Canada and Australia, for example. But there are criticisms that it’s under-resourced in comparison to what we might see in the US.

And also the processes requiring are obviously more complicated than they would be for a single state, such as the US. So there’s also complaints about slow reaction times.

[AH]: Interesting, and obviously, you are sitting there, Jon, in the UK. I’m curious as to what the UK is doing now. It’s not part of the EU.

[JS]: No, indeed not. And it’s sort of looking for a role and a position in the world. But the defense sector does play, what the government describes as a catalytic role, for its efforts to secure critical raw materials amid these heightened geopolitical tensions.

So UK policy for securing cobalt, gallium, germanium and antimony is primarily through security of supply policy, international partnerships and defense procurement.

So it does have a critical mineral strategy, and the UK treats these metals as strategically important. Having said that, it does have rather limited resources compared to the EU or the US, and so not only sort of financially, but also of course physically, what there is to be mined and reduced here. So the emphasis is more on resilience and diversification of supply rather than self-sufficiency.

The UK is also encouraging onshoring of refining and processing and recycling of its own. And there are projects that are being muted for cobalt, for example, and they’re supported by the UK Research and Innovation Funding and defense focused innovation programmes. It’s also reassessing, stockpiling and long-term offtake agreements.

What they want is an uninterrupted supply of these niche, but mission-critical materials. But it must be said that the scale is much smaller than what we’re seeing elsewhere, and much less than what we consider from the US, where they’re having a much heavier investment.

[AH]: Well, you mentioned the US there. Go on. Then let’s compare the other approaches we are seeing in different regions to the US approach to securing these defense materials.

[JS]: Well, yeah, on the US side, it’s on a different scale. The US is pouring significant resources to secure defense critical supplies. Hundreds of millions of dollars is being invested.

They have a much broader approach. Their latest call out to the market was for 60 metals. They were covering. So as part of that, of the four we’re discussing today, there’s a combination of industrial policy, stockpiling, domestic production support and cooperation with allies in a bid to try and shore up their own supply.

So, under the Defense Production Act, the Department of Defense in the US has provided funding to expand its own processing and refining capacity. For minerals such as cobalt and antimony, and support byproduct recovery of their own supplies from aluminium and zincs smelters.

US is also rebuilding and managing strategic stockpiles through the Defense Logistics Agency, which is, you know, it’s interesting to stockpiling returning to Western purchasing, and this has also taken place against a backdrop of export controls and geopolitical disruption.

Internationally, Washington is strengthening its own supply chains with its allies, with attempts at bilateral agreements and the mineral security partnership. Overall, though that that the scale and ambition of investment dwarfs what’s happening in Europe, but there are criticisms that this breadth is also a problem in that it lacks focus precisely what it is they’re trying to achieve.

If you are trying to achieve everything seemingly at once, which is a lofty ambition.

[AH]: Yeah, for sure. I can tell from living here that compared to Europe, the US definitely tends to move faster and with a more centralized authority, especially when national security is explicitly invoked. Just turning to that side, the collaboration with industry and defense, what kind of role does the defense industry itself play in addressing all of these challenges you’ve been talking about?

[JS]: Well there, there is a role for the primes for these really large businesses in this top level policy-based initiatives in Europe. So last month, the European Union held its first round of matchmaking for producers and consumers for the blocks 17 Strategic War materials when they put in place a new procurement platform for them.

Three of the four materials we’re talking about today are included; antimony isn’t one of those. So, the raw materials mechanism is designed to bring more transparency and diversification to the market. On the purchasing side, it’s got global reach and is intended to link European off-takers with both European and international suppliers.

So defense purchasers have the option there to aggregate demand in order to maximize their opportunities. It serves a new project, and it’ll be interesting to see how that gets off the ground and works in the real world.

[AH]: Yeah, I mean, it certainly sounds like industry’s being pushed into a much more strategic role than it had potentially traditionally played.

Final question for you, Jon. What should listeners take away from this discussion?

[JS]: I suppose the good news from a European perspective is that while there might be export controls in place, that the volumes required for defense purposes are relatively small. Therefore, if you’re willing to pay, you can always, of course, achieve the materials that you require.

Looking further afields. Also, I think Europe has the potential to become a really strong recycling system. It’s setting up really healthy processes there to develop recycling, that’s obviously being pursued from the top end, from European EC policy downwards.

So there are some positive signs out there despite the limited opportunities and complicated picture in terms of the domestic mining and processing situation, but it’s definitely gonna be a long process we’re gonna have to see developing over time.

[AH]: Jon, great insights. Really appreciate you for taking the time, and thank you for joining us today.

[JS]: That’s an absolute pleasure. Many thanks.

[AH]: Well, that’s it for today’s market Briefing. If you enjoyed it, do give us a like, share it with someone who might find it useful and subscribe because it really helps keep us going and keep an eye out on your feed for the Fast forward long form podcast.

Next episode, we’ve got an interview with Stellar Lee of BYD, and honestly, I came away from that one having learned a huge amount about how the company operates.

And where it’s heading, so stay tuned.